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Charles Jewell and a friend were drinking in a bar in Tijuana when a stranger offered to sell them 
marijuana, which they declined.1 The stranger then made a second proposal:  he had a car which 
needed to be driven into the United States, and he would pay them to handle that for him. 
Jewell’s friend was suspicious, wanting no part in the arrangement. Jewell, however, examined 
the car cursorily, did not see anything worrisome, and agreed to the transaction. He suspected 
something might have been amiss, but he figured that if he hadn’t found anything, neither would 
law enforcement. Jewell’s prediction was wrong:  customs agents found 110 pounds of marijuana 
hidden between the trunk and the rear seat. Jewell was arrested and charged with knowingly 
possessing a controlled substance. The case presents a puzzle. The stranger did not tell Jewell 
there was marijuana in the car, and Jewell did not see the hidden marijuana. Could Jewell rightly 
be convicted of knowingly possessing marijuana?  
 
In Criminally Ignorant, Alexander Sarch defends the practice of convicting deliberately ignorant 
wrongdoers of crimes requiring knowledge. As Sarch’s subtitle puts it, if we (as defendants) 
purposefully shield ourselves from learning inculpatory facts, “the law pretends we know what 
we don’t.” Sarch argues for this legal pretense on principled grounds, urging us to see that 
deliberately ignorant wrongdoings and knowing wrongdoings can be equally culpable, 
manifesting the same degree of insufficient regard toward the same legally protected interests. 
Sarch’s core argument is as follows:  In cases of deliberately ignorant wrongdoing, there are two 
wrongs the law should recognize. There is the primary wrongdoing, e.g., Jewell recklessly driving 
across the border aware of the risk that he was transporting contraband. There is also a 
secondary wrongdoing, the violation of the duty to reasonably inform oneself of the risks one 
creates. This duty is a narrow, conditional duty:  if an agent realizes that her intended action will 
pose risks to legally protected interests, the agent has a duty to investigate those risks. When 
Jewell planned to drive across the border, he created a risk to the legal interests (such as they 
are) protected by the laws against transporting controlled substances, and so he had a duty to 
investigate the possibility that there was contraband in the car, a duty he violated by his 
deliberate ignorance. Because of the intimate relationship between the two violations, and 
because the two violations transgress against the same legally protected interests, the culpability 
generated by the two violations may properly be aggregated. And in some cases, e.g., where the 
potential investigation would have been easy and where there is no legally recognized reason 
not to investigate, this aggregation will confer sufficient extra culpability to make up the gap 




1 This narrative is taken from the seminal culpable-ignorance case United States v. Jewell, 532 F. 
2d 697 (9th Cir. 1976). 
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Sarch’s defense of imputing knowledge to deliberately ignorant wrongdoers is creative and 
thorough. Readers will benefit from his substantial work on the manifestation of ill will in criminal 
wrongdoing, on our epistemic duties with regard to the risks we create and impose, on the 
justification of imputation principles in the criminal law, and on other mens-rea imputation 
principles his argument tempts us to consider. This is a valuable and instructive text. 
 
The Principle of Lenity at the center of Sarch’s account of the manifestation of ill will in criminal 
wrongdoing is especially promising. On that principle, a criminal wrongdoing “manifests the least 
amount of insufficient regard for legally protected interests or values … needed to explain why a 
rational and otherwise well-motivated person would do” the wrong (p. 51).2 Sarch shows how 
his Principle of Lenity captures a number of features of our criminal law practice. For example, 
Sarch has us imagine a deeply malevolent vandal, so eager to cause harm that he would have 
committed an act of violent terrorism if given the opportunity. If culpability were to track the full 
extent of the wrongdoer’s actual wayward psychology, then the vandal seems fit for a severe 
punishment. However, we punish the vandal only for vandalism, and Sarch’s account of 
culpability captures this. Even though this vandal would have done far worse, it takes only a small 
amount of deviant disregard to allow an otherwise well-motivated agent to commit vandalism. 
Sarch’s idealized account gets us the right result. 
 
In this instance, as in many others, we should recognize the tight connection between the 
criminal law and our interpersonal responsibility practices. Accordingly, I suspect that many of 
Sarch’s arguments for his Principle of Lenity within the criminal law extend comfortably to 
interpersonal morality and to the ethics of blame. Sarch argues that incorporating the Principle 
of Lenity within the criminal law is a means for legislatures to display generosity, kindness, and 
mercy and that adhering to the Principle of Lenity will help with social bonding and cohesion. The 
Principle of Lenity is also a nicely restrained principle, guiding agential evaluation without 
requiring invasive investigations of other’s mental states and the sorts of evidence that might 
bear on those mental states and without calling for off-putting, imperious verdicts on others 
internal mental states, verdicts sure to be ill-fitting given just how complex our mental states 
actually are. I can imagine analogs of arguments like these applying nicely to interpersonal 
morality. 
 
Extending the Principle of Lenity to interpersonal morality can help explain the contours of our 
interpersonal blaming practices. I suspect that the Principle of Lenity might help buttress our 
confidence in two ways that interpersonal blame (like criminal punishment) seems imperfectly 
sensitive to the particulars of a wrongdoer’s character. First, as in the criminal law, we blame 
each other for the wrongs we do commit, not for all the wrongs we might commit if given the 
opportunity and the notion. Sarch’s example of the vandal who might have done far worse given 
the opportunity extends nicely here. Accordingly, we often blame each other to a degree less 
than might be warranted by a more direct assessment of character or quality of will. Second, we 
are ordinarily comfortable blaming a wrongdoer even when their wrongdoing is out of character. 
That a person is generally honest is no defense to being blamed for a lie they do tell (even if the 
 
2 Unless otherwise indicated, all references are to Criminally Ignorant. 
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out-of-character liar might deserve less blame than the unrepentant and regular liar). 
Accordingly, we often blame each other to a degree more than might be warranted by a more 
direct assessment of character or quality of will. The Principle of Lenity can help us understand 
both of these phenomena. Our blame does not function as a report on our underlying moral 
psychology, and thus our wrongdoing is not to be treated as mere imperfect evidence of that 
psychology. Instead, the Principle of Lenity makes clear that we care about the manifested quality 
of will, not the underlying psychology, and that manifested quality of will can be understood in 
an idealized sense. Both phenomena are thus nicely captured by Sarch’s principle—and I expect 
more study by moral philosophers will reveal other virtues of including a Principle of Lenity in our 
moral philosophy. 
 
I now want to raise two objections. First, I want to push an objection relating to institutional 
design. Granting Sarch’s argument that culpably ignorant wrongdoing can be culpable in the 
same way and to the same degree as knowing wrongdoing, why should the law’s response be to 
include an element of pretense? Why not just treat the wrong at issue as culpable under its own 
description? In Jewell’s case, for instance, why not think that the right response would have been 
to convict Jewell of an aggravated case of reckless transportation of controlled substances? 
American criminal law provides many mechanisms for incorporating aggravating factors into the 
determination of sentencing. There are statutory mechanisms, regulatory mechanisms, and 
discretionary mechanisms. Moreover, supposing that the sentencing ranges for reckless and 
knowing wrongdoings overlap, these ordinary aggravating mechanisms could serve to perfectly 
capture the equivalent culpability Sarch describes. (And insofar as the sentencing ranges do not 
overlap, that revision of the law seems more straightforward than the imputation principle Sarch 
calls for). So, supposing that the reckless behavior is itself criminal, it is not clear why we should 
prefer an imputation principle over an aggravation provision that more honestly describes the 
wrongful behavior. 
 
But the supposition that the reckless behavior is itself criminal is not always warranted. For 
example, Jewell was convicted under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (1). Section 841(a)(1) makes it a crime 
“knowingly or intentionally to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, or possess with intent to 
manufacture, distribute, or dispense, a controlled substance.” As far as I can tell, there is no 
analogous recklessness or negligence crime. (Do not take this as legal advice. I am not your 
lawyer.) But for an imputation principle, it seems that Jewell would have escaped conviction 
altogether. 
 
Imputing knowledge in the absence of a recklessness crime raises concerns related to the 
principle of legality.3 As Sarch explains, under the principle of legality, “it is not legally permitted 
 
3 Then-judge Anthony Kennedy raised this legality concern in his dissenting opinion in Jewell. As 
Sarch notes, Douglas Husak and Craig Callender (1994) address the legality concern by calling for 
criminalizing the failure to satisfy the epistemic duty. Such a reform would substantially abate 
the challenge here, as it would avoid pretending from the outset. Sarch addresses the legality 
concern by inviting legislative reform, but that solution is only partial. Insofar as the legislative 
reform preserves the pretense, aspects of the legality concern remain. 
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to penalize someone without a law prohibiting that conduct.” The principle of legality is 
appealing:  If the law is to guide us, then it must offer clear instructions, and it seems an ambush 
to first appear to permit some behavior and later to punish the behavior anyway. Of course, Sarch 
is not calling for prosecutions in the absence of a law prohibiting the conduct. On Sarch’s account, 
conduct like Jewell’s would have been prohibited by a combination of the proscription of the 
knowing wrong and the augmentation of the imputation principle. But the concern about legality 
is driven in large part by concern for fair notice. Sarch’s scheme involves technical jargon:  Given 
his culpable-ignorance rule, “knowledge” in the criminal code means something different than 
“knowledge” means to the rest of us. That jargon undermines fair notice. And the law’s guidance 
should be especially clear as to the distinction between permissible and impermissible behavior. 
If the law is functioning well, we should imagine that criminals are often disappointed to have 
been caught but rarely surprised by the court’s interpretation of law. However, it is easy to 
imagine Jewell being caught off guard in this way. 
 
Sarch’s imputation rule, at least as applied in Jewell’s case, can be distinguished from other 
familiar imputation rules. For instance, consider the doctrine of transferred intent in homicide. If 
a defendant intends to and attempts to kill A but accidentally kills B instead, the doctrine of 
transferred intent in homicide permits us to convict the defendant of intentional homicide. A 
second example is the felony-murder rule. If a defendant’s conduct during the commission of a 
felony brings about an unintended death, the felony-murder rule permits us to convict that 
defendant of murder. Finally, consider the Pinkerton doctrine, from Pinkerton v. United States, 
328 U.S. 640 (1946). Under that doctrine, a defendant in a criminal conspiracy may be held 
responsible for the substantive crimes other conspirators commit in furtherance of the 
conspiracy. In all of these cases, the defendant was already guilty of some other crime:  
attempted murder in the first case, the underlying felony in the second, and criminal conspiracy 
in the third.4 By contrast, neither Jewell’s reckless transportation of his controlled substance nor 
his failure to satisfy the duty to be reasonably self-informed were themselves crimes. Jewell was 
convicted of a knowledge crime despite lacking knowledge (as knowledge is ordinarily 
understood, Sarch stipulates) and despite neither of the grounds for imputation being 
themselves crimes. 
 
Accordingly, Sarch’s account faces a dilemma. Either there is a recklessness crime, and then it is 
not clear why we should not prefer an aggravated sentence to a pretending, or there is not a 
recklessness crime, and then pretending raises serious legality concerns. Either way, the pretense 
involved in the culpable-ignorance imputation rule is unattractive. 
 
My second objection is to Sarch’s culpability-aggregation claim. At the heart of Sarch’s argument 
is the claim that culpably ignorant recklessness can be culpable in the same way and to the same 
degree as knowing wrongdoing. That equivalence claim is grounded in aggregation. There are 
two component wrongs in culpable ignorance cases:  the intentional preservation of ignorance 
 
4 Sarch also considers the voluntary-intoxication doctrine, which could be understood as an 
exception to this pattern. I express skepticism about the voluntary-intoxication doctrine 
elsewhere (2016). 
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and then the reckless ultimate wrong. We are to look at the compound wrong composed of the 
two of them, and we are to ask how much culpable disregard that compound wrong manifests. 
As Sarch writes: 
For this imputation to be justified on my theory, it must be the case that (i) + (ii) [the 
combination of the intentional preservation of ignorance and the reckless ultimate 
wrong] manifests at least as much insufficient regard for the very same set of protected 
interests, values, and rights as (iii) [the comparable knowing wrong] does. (p. 168, 
emphasis omitted) 
We are not identifying the culpability manifested separately by the two component wrongs and 
then somehow summing those results; rather, we are identifying the compound wrong and 
identifying the one manifestation of culpability by the single, aggregate wrong. 
 
Why should we think that the aggregate wrong manifests more culpability than the worst of its 
components? Sarch argues that the aggregate wrong is more culpable than the worst of its 
component wrongs because one who commits an aggregate wrongdoing has “misse[d] two 
opportunities to help assure oneself that one won’t bring about” the harm (p. 169). In another 
context, Sarch explains that “sometimes the only way to account for the fact that an offender 
repeatedly commits a given crime is that he has even less regard for his victims than it would take 
to get him to do the same crime just once” (pp. 185-186). Given Sarch’s Principle of Lenity, 
increasing the number of missed opportunities to act rightly results in increased culpability. 
Accordingly, aggregate wrongs should be more culpable than the worst of their components. 
 
I was moved by this argument, but it is too powerful. There are many cases where wrongdoers 
have multiple opportunities to avoid committing their ultimate harm. Consider a different path 
Jewell might have taken. Imagine that Jewell and his friend had wanted a Mexican vacation a 
little further from the border and had gone to Ensenada instead of stopping in Tijuana. There, as 
before, they meet a stranger in a bar. Again, Jewell has some suspicions, but he does not even 
think to inspect the car (or, perhaps, he does, but it becomes apparent that anything there is 
hidden beyond his ability to uncover it). He is ignorant, but not deliberately or intentionally so. 
Jewell drives the car over 100 kilometers to the American border. Along the way, he thinks several 
times about the high likelihood that the car contains contraband, but he continues driving. What 
should we say about Jewell in this case? 
 
My intuition, consistent with Sarch’s aggregation principle, is that the extended drive does 
manifest greater culpability than a short drive would. It plausibly does take more disregard to 
keep at the wrongdoing for nearly two hours than for just a few minutes. However, it seems that 
Sarch’s argument would also allow us to convict this reckless Jewell of a knowledge crime, even 
though there is no culpable ignorance in this case, just extended recklessness. Finding greater 
culpability in the doggedly reckless Jewell seems correct. Indeed, I am comfortably accepting that 
some especially doggedly committed reckless Jewell might manifest more culpability than an 
impulsive knowing Jewell, so I accept that extended recklessness regarding the ultimate harm 
could yield equivalent or even greater culpability than mere knowing wrongdoing. However, 
convicting the extended-reckless wrongdoer of a knowledge crime seems too much. And yet it is 
not clear that Sarch has principled grounds to distinguish the two sorts of imputation. 
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Perhaps Sarch can retell this story to make it more palatable to convict extended-reckless 
wrongdoers of knowledge crimes. But I suspect that the better course is to reject this result by 
pointing to some deeper connection between culpable ignorance and knowledge. It isn’t just that 
there are multiple opportunities to avoid doing wrong. Culpable ignorance and knowledge are 
both epistemic phenomena, and I suspect that if the imputation principle is to be justified, that 
connection will have to be made more central. 
 
Both of these objections should be understood as inviting Sarch to continue his valuable project 
so that we can learn more about institutional design and whether there is something special 
about the epistemic nature of culpable ignorance. But those further questions do not denigrate 
the work before us. Sarch’s book is full of rich material on criminal culpability, on lenity within 
culpability, and on the culpability of failing to investigate. I think his work has excavated and 
made clearer many of the issues within imputation. I remain undecided—open but skeptical—
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5 My comments are developed from comments I offered during an Author-Meets-Critics session 
on Criminally Ignorant at the American Philosophical Association’s Eastern Division Meeting in 
January 2020. I participated in that session with Alexander Sarch, Emad Atiq, Mihailis Diamantis, 
and Robert Hughes. I thank them and our audience for a productive and lively conversation about 
Sarch’s text. 
